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1Discrete-modulation continuous-variable quantum
key distribution enhanced by quantum scissors
Masoud Ghalaii, Carlo Ottaviani, Rupesh Kumar, Stefano Pirandola, and Mohsen Razavi
Abstract—It is known that quantum scissors, as non-
deterministic amplifiers, can enhance the performance of
Gaussian-modulated continuous-variable quantum key distribu-
tion (CV-QKD) in noisy and long-distance regimes of operation.
Here, we extend this result to a non-Gaussian CV-QKD protocol
with discrete modulation. We show that, by using a proper setting,
the use of quantum scissors in the receiver of such discrete-
modulation CV-QKD protocols would allow us to achieve positive
secret key rates at high loss and high excess noise regimes of
operation, which would have been otherwise impossible. This
also keeps the prospect of running discrete-modulation CV-QKD
over CV quantum repeaters alive.
Index Terms—Quantum key distribution, quantum amplifiers,
quantum communication, cryptography.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a promising technology
for establishing private cryptographic keys between two users
[1–3]. The security of QKD, which was first introduced in
1984 [4], is based on restricting the eavesdropper by the laws
of quantum mechanics rather than her ability to efficiently
solve certain mathematical problems of high computational
complexity [5]. If properly implemented, this makes QKD
secure against the most powerful computers now and in the
future.
QKD can be implemented using a number of optical
techniques, the most well-known genre of which relies on
encoding the key bits on, e.g., the polarization of single
photons, among other discrete degrees of freedom of optical
signals. Continuous-variable QKD (CV-QKD) protocols, such
as the Gaussian-modulated technique proposed by Grosshans
and Grangier in 2002 (GG02) [6, 7], are introduced as an
alternative class, where coherent communication techniques,
such as homodyne or heterodyne detection, are employed [8–
10]. In a CV-QKD protocol, data is encoded on the quadratures
of an optical field [6, 7, 11–13].
The progress in implementing CV-QKD protocols has been
noteworthy in the past few years [14, 15]. This has been
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facilitated by removing some of the security challenges arisen
from regenerating the local oscillator [16–18] at the receiver,
and by the involvement of some commercial actors [19] to
further deploy such technologies. Despite this progress, it is
generally believed that CV-QKD is perhaps a good option for
short-distance or low-loss links [20], while discrete-variable
QKD could be more suitable for long distances. This is partly
because of the difficulties with implementing highly efficient
reconciliation algorithms for CV-QKD, as well as the less
developed quantum repeater paradigms for CV systems.
The scope for long-distance CV-QKD has, however,
changed with some recent developments in the field. For
instance, one solution is to use non-deterministic amplification
[21–24]. It has been shown that by using a realistic imple-
mentation of an amplification device, e.g., a quantum scissor
(QS) [24–26], the security distance of Gaussian-modulated
CV-QKD protocols can be increased. Quantum scissors have
already been demonstrated experimentally [27, 28] and used
for entanglement distillation [29]. Using quantum scissors, or
similar ideas, the first generation of CV quantum repeaters
have then been proposed [30–32]. Another technique that can
potentially improve the rate-versus-distance behavior in CV-
QKD protocols is to use a non-Gaussian discrete modulation
[33–37]. It is generally perceived that, especially, at low signal-
to-noise ratio levels, which we have to deal with at long
distances, it would be easier to design an error correction
scheme for discrete-modulation encoding as opposed to the
Gaussian one [37, 38].
In this paper, we consider all above enabling factors within
a single setup to study the rate-versus-distance behavior for
a discrete-modulation CV-QKD system that uses quantum
scissors at its receiver. This is effectively the main building
block in the quantum repeater setup proposed in Ref. [30],
which, in our work, is used for discrete-modulation CV-QKD.
A realistic analysis of our setup could then be used to assess
the practicality of the proposed repeater setups. It has already
been shown that, by using an ideal non-deterministic linear
amplifier (NLA) at the receiver’s side, one can increase the
maximum transmission distance and tolerable excess noise
of the quadrature-phase-shift-keying (QPSK) protocol [23].
However, a study that accounts for a realistic NLA, such as
a quantum scissor, is missing. This is important, because one
of the key incentives for using discrete-modulation CV-QKD
is its similarity with existing coherent optical communications
systems, which possibly makes its adoption and implemen-
tation more straightforward. It is also important to consider
a physical realization of the NLA in our system, as opposed
to measurement-based ones [39–41], because otherwise the
2system cannot be used in a repeater setup. Measurement-
based NLAs often offer lower key rates when used in CV-
QKD setups [42], which is another reason for considering
the physical deployment of a QS in our setup. For further
clarification on this matter, interested readers are referred to
the discussions in Ref. [24].
The security analysis of discrete-modulation CV-QKD has
turned out to be more challenging than its Gaussian counter-
part. The reported analysis in Ref. [33] relies on the linearity
of the channel for its security. But, the authors admit that
this is not an easy condition to verify. In order to rectify this
problem, in Ref. [37], they come up with a modified scheme in
which they can relax the assumption on the channel linearity
by requiring Alice to send three types of signals: Gaussian
modulated ones for channel estimation, discrete-modulation
ones for key generation, and a range of decoy states to conceal
the discrepancy between the latter two in the eyes of an
eavesdropper. The decoy states would, effectively, make the
modulated signals look Gaussian, which makes the security
analysis more manageable. This approach, however, to a large
extent, takes away the practical aspects of discrete-modulation
CV-QKD. Very recently, new analyses have emerged, which
rely on numerical optimization of the key rate based on certain
constraints obtained from the measurement results [43, 44].
In our setup, we have another complication that results from
using the QS, which is non-deterministic. This would further
make the channel non-Gaussian, which implies that the opti-
mal attack by an eavesdropper could also be non-Gaussian. By
carefully engineering our system to remain close to Gaussian,
we can, however, obtain a reasonable estimation of the secret
key rate by restricting the eavesdropper to Gaussian attacks
enabled by an entangling cloner [45]. This allows us to use a
thermal-loss model for the channel, for which we calculate the
key rate. We show how the performance of our non-Gaussian
CV-QKD system is enhanced in this case, especially in high-
loss and high-excess noise regimes.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Sec. II, we
describe the system under study. In Sec. III, we present the key
rate analysis of the QS-assisted CV-QKD protocol with non-
Gaussian modulation. We then discuss our numerical results
in Sec. IV and conclude our paper in Sec. V.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
In this section, we present our proposed QS-amplified CV-
QKD protocol with discrete modulation and its equivalent
entanglement-based (EB) version. Both schemes are depicted
in Fig. 1. Different components of the system are described
below.
A. Modulation and Detection
In a conventional non-Gaussian/discrete modulation pro-
tocol, a particular finite constellation of coherent states is
considered and used for encoding data. A constellation of four
and eight coherent states are the well-known cases [23, 33–
35, 37]. In this study, we focus on the QPSK protocol. We
assume that the sender, Alice (A), sends her prepared signals to
the receiver, Bob (B), via a quantum channel. In our proposed
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Fig. 1. System description. (a) Schematic view of discrete-modulation CV-
QKD protocol equipped with a quantum scissor as part of its receiver. Here,
the four yellow circles at the sender side represent the constellation of the
four coherent states used at the encoder. (b) The entanglement-based CV-
QKD protocol equivalent to (a). The quantum channel is modeled by the
equivalent excess noise at the transmitter side, represented by εtm, and its
transmissivity T . |Ψ〉01, QS, Hom and P boxes, respectively, represent the
bipartite entangled state in Eq. (1), a probabilistic quantum scissor as seen
in Fig. 2, the homodyne detection and projective measurement modules in
{|ψk〉0} basis.
protocol, however, Bob is equipped with a single QS in order
to amplify the received signal. Bob applies the QS operation
just before his homodyne detection, which are both owned
and handled by him. The homodyne measurement results are
recorded whenever the QS operation is successful.
More precisely, the prepare and measure (P&M) version of
the protocol runs as follows. First, Alice randomly chooses a
coherent state from the set {|αk〉 = |αe(2k+1)ipi/4〉}3k=0, with
α ∈ R+, and sends it to Bob through a quantum channel; see
Fig. 1(a). Such a constellation can be generated by rotation of
a coherent state in the position-momentum phase space. The
parameter α can be optimized to give the maximum secret
key rate. In addition, we assume αk = (xAk + ipAk)/2, k =
0, . . . , 3, with real parameters xAk and pAk being chosen
randomly according to the following uniform probability mass
functions: fXA(xAk) = fPA(pAk) = 1/4. At the receiver,
Bob randomly measures one quadrature, x̂B = â
†
B + âB
or p̂B = i(â
†
B − âB), of the QS output using homodyne
detection, where â†B represents the creation operator for the
output mode of the QS. The trusted parties, Alice and Bob,
keep the detection results only if the QS operation is successful
in the respective round; that is, only one of detectors D1 or
D2, in Fig. 2, clicks. By doing reconciliation and privacy
amplification, the parties can then obtain a common string
of secret bits.
In order to calculate the secret key generation rate, espe-
cially the Holevo information term, it is often easier to con-
sider the equivalent EB scheme, which is shown in Fig. 1(b).
In the EB version, instead of randomly choosing and sending
single-mode coherent states, Alice measures one mode of a
bipartite entangled state, and sends the other one to Bob. In
the Gaussian modulation case, the employed entangled state
is a two-mode squeezed vacuum (TMSV) state, and Alice
measurement is heterodyne detection. In the case of the QPSK
protocol, it has been shown that one can start with a TMSV
3state, and apply a certain measurement to obtain the following
state [37]
|Ψ〉01 =
3∑
k=0
√
λk |φk〉0|φk〉1
=
1
2
3∑
k=0
|ψk〉0|αk〉1, (1)
where
|φk〉 =
−α22√
λk
∞∑
n=0
(−1)n α
4n+k√
(4n+ k)!
|4n+ k〉
and
|ψk〉0 = 1
2
3∑
m=0
e(2k+1)impi/4|φm〉0
are orthogonal non-Gaussian states, with λ0,2 =
e−α
2/2
(
cosh(α2) ± cos(α2))/2 and λ1,3 =
e−α
2/2
(
sinh(α2) ± sin(α2))/2. The subscripts 0 and 1
refer to optical modes represented by â0 and â1, respectively.
In the procedure described in Ref. [37], there is a chance that
instead of the state in Eq. (1), we end up with a decoy state.
In this paper, we focus only on the key generation part, which
results from the state in Eq. (1), and do not consider the
parameter estimation task, for which we should either send
Gaussian modulated states [37], or use numerical techniques
[43]. In the end, the equivalence of P&M and EB schemes of
the protocols is obtained via a proper projective measurement
P̂ in {|ψk〉0}, k = 0, . . . , 3, basis.
B. Quantum Channel
The parties are assumed to use a thermal-loss channel with
transmittivity T and an excess noise ε. A potential model for
such a channel is given by a beam splitter, with transmissivity
T , that mixes Alice’s signals and the eavesdropper’s thermal
state, given by the following expression:
ρ̂th =
∫
d2β
e−
|β|2
ε/2
piε/2
|β〉âN〈β|, (2)
where âN is the annihilation operator corresponding to the
noise port, and d2β = dℜβdℑβ. The equivalent excess noise
at the input to the channel is then given by εtm = (1−T )ε/T .
In principle, the parties cannot tell what kind of channel
they have without proper parameter estimation. As we will
explain in Sec. III, the assumption of a thermal-loss channel
corresponds to the case of a Gaussian attack enabled by an
entangling cloner, which may not be optimal for our non-
Gaussian system. However, as long as the system does not
deviate considerably from the Gaussian framework, the results
obtained are expected to provide us with a reasonable estimate
of the potential key rate [46] that can be obtained by a more
rigorous analysis. We use the above model to calculate the
relevant parameters of the co-variance matrix when QSs are
in use.
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Fig. 2. The schematic view of a quantum scissor. Here, we assume that a
ready-to-shoot ideal single-photon source (SPS) is in use, and that the single-
photon detectors have unity efficiencies. The QS amplification gain is defined
as g =
√
(1− µ)/µ .
C. Quantum Scissors
Quantum scissors are at the core of the NLA module
proposed by Ralph and Lund [26]. A single QS has two beam
splitters in its setup, one of which is balanced while the other
has a transmittance µ; see Fig. 2. The 50:50 beam splitter
couples the incoming signal to a single photon that has gone
through the imbalanced beam splitter. A click on exactly one
of detectors D1 and D2 would herald success of the QS. We
note that an on-demand ideal single photon source assumed
here in our analysis.
Here we obtain the output state of the QS, upon successful
operation, for an input state ρ̂ = 14
∑3
k=0 |αk〉〈αk| to the
thermal-loss channel described in Sec. II-B. In order to do so,
we use the results reported in Ref. [24], in which the output
state of such a setup for an arbitrary coherent state at the input
has been derived. We then obtain
ρ̂QS(α) =a(α)|0〉1〈0|+ c(α)|1〉1〈1|, (3)
where ρ̂QS(α) is the density matrix at the output of the QS
upon successful operation and

a(α) = 2µ[2F (2F+1)+T |α|
2]
(2F+1)3P PS(α)
e−
T |α|2
2F+1
c(α) = 2(1−µ)
P PS(α)
(
e
−
T |α|2
2F+1
2F+1 − e
−
T |α|2
2F
4F
)
,
(4)
with F = 12 +
1
4Tεtm. In Eq. (4),
PPS(α) =
2[(2F + 1)2 − µ(2F + 1) + µT |α|2]
(2F + 1)3
e−
T |α|2
2F+1
− 1− µ
2F
e−
T |α|2
2F
=Psucc(α)/2, (5)
where Psucc(α) is the success probability for the QS.
An interesting observation from Eq. (3) is that the output
state of the QS is non-Gaussian. This is not just because we
have used non-Gaussian modulation, but even for a single
coherent state at the input, as discussed in Ref. [24], the
output state is in the subspace spanned by {|0〉, |1〉}. There are
two implications for this behavior. First, the QS amplification
cannot be noise free, as in an ideal NLA, but the amount of
noise can vary based on the input signal and the amplification
gain. Further, this non-Gaussianity can complicate the secu-
rity analysis of the protocol. In our work, we manage this
additional complexity by restricting the eavesdropper (Eve) to
collective Gaussian attacks [47], as we will discuss in Sec. III.
4The non-Gaussianity of the channel manifests itself in the
statistics that we can obtain from Bob’s homodyne measure-
ment. In particular, using similar techniques as in Ref. [24],
the output probability distribution of x̂B-quadrature can be
calculated as follows:
fXB (xB) = tr[ρ̂QS(α)|xB〉〈xB |]
=
[
a(α) + 2c(α)x2B
]e−x2B√
pi
, (6)
with x̂B |xB〉 = xB |xB〉. As can be seen in Eq. (6), similar to
the Gaussian-modulation case, the output probability distribu-
tion function is composed of a Gaussian and a non-Gaussian
term. In the regime, where a(α) ≫ c(α), we are very close
to a fully Gaussian system. For this to happen α needs to
be small. In the other extreme, when c(α) ≫ a(α), we get
a bimodal form for the output distribution, which is clearly
non-Gaussian. A similar observation, although via a different
technique, has been made in earlier experiments on QSs, where
the asymmetry in the measured Wigner functions grows with
increase in the intensity of the input state [27].
Similarly, we can work out the conditional output probabil-
ity distribution:
fXB (xB |xAk) = tr[ρ̂QS,c(xAk)|xB〉〈xB |], (7)
where
ρ̂QS,c(xAk) =ac(xAk)|0〉1〈0|+ bc(xAk)|0〉1〈1|
+ b∗c(xAk)|1〉1〈0|+ cc(xAk)|1〉1〈1| (8)
is the QS output state conditioned on Alice sending a signal
with X quadrature xAk and observing a click on D1. In this
case,

ac(xAk) =
2µ
(
4F (2F+1)+T (α2+2x2k)
)
(2F+1)3P PSc (xAk)
e−
T (α2+2x2k)
2(2F+1)
bc(xAk) = − 2
√
µ(1−µ)T xk
(2F+1)2P PSc (xAk)
e−
T (α2+2x2k)
2(2F+1)
cc(xAk) = 1− ac(xAk)
(9)
and
PPSc (xAk) =
2(2F + 1)2 − 2µ(2F + 1) + µT (α2 + 2x2k)
(2F + 1)3
× e−
T (α2+2x2k)
2(2F+1) − 1− µ
2F
e−
T (α2+2x2k)
4F . (10)
We will later use the above expressions in order to calculate
the mutual information between the parties.
III. SECRET KEY RATE ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the key rate analysis for our QS-
equipped QKD system. We calculate the secret key generation
rate for our system under the assumption that the eavesdropper
is limited to Gaussian attacks. That is, we assume that the
eavesdropper replaces the channel with an entangling cloner,
where one part of a TMSV state is coupled, at a beam splitter,
with Alice’s signal and sent to Bob, while the other part would
be retained by Eve and will be measured once Alice and Bob
have sifted their data. In this case, we can assume that the
effective channel between Alice and Bob is a thermal-loss
channel as we described in Sec. II-B. Note that, the key rate
obtained in this case is not necessarily a lower bound on the
key rate in the most general case because the optimal attack
by an eavesdropper can be non-Gaussian. That is, for a given
joint state between Alice and Bob, the required purification by
Eve may not be obtained by an entangling cloner. Assuming
that Eve uses an entangling cloner, however, at each run of the
protocol, the state between Alice, Eve, and Bob, before the QS,
is pure. Now because in the QS operation we make a projective
measurement, the conditional state between Alice, Eve, and
Bob, after the QS, is also pure. This is exactly the same state
by which we calculate the Holevo information component of
the key rate. As it is pointed out in Refs. [46], the key rate
obtained in our case is expected to be a close approximation
to a true lower bound on the key rate for the nominal joint
state obtained by Alice and Bob.
In the asymptotic limit of many runs of the protocol, the
secret key rate of a CV-QKD protocol under collective attack
is given by [12]
K = βIAB − χEB , (11)
where β, IAB , and χEB are, respectively, the reconciliation
efficiency, the mutual information between the parties, and the
leaked/accessible information to Eve when reverse reconcili-
ation is used. However, since the QS is a non-deterministic
operation, the key rate should be multiplied by the average
probability of success, Psucc(α), where all possible inputs are
considered in the averaging. Therefore, the secret key rate
reads as follows
KQS ≥ Psucc(α)(βIAB − χEB). (12)
In our protocol, we discard data associated to the unsuccessful
events and use only the post-selected data in order to produce
a secret string of bits. In the following, we first derive the
exact value for IAB , in Sec. III-A, and an upper bound for
χEB , in Sec. III-B, for the thermal-loss channel.
A. Mutual Information
By definition, the mutual information of two random vari-
ables XA and XB is the difference between the entropy
function H(XB) and the conditional entropy H(XB |XA):
IAB = H(XB)−H(XB |XA), (13)
where
H(XB) =
∫
dxB fXB (xB) log2
1
fXB (xB)
(14)
and
H(XB |XA) = 1
4
3∑
k=0
∫
dxB fXB (xB |xAk) log2
1
fXB (xB |xAk)
.
(15)
Functions fXB (xB) and fXB (xB |xAk) are given in Eqs. (6)
and (7), using which and the above equations, we numerically
calculate the mutual information. We note that the input
quadrature is a discrete random variable whereas the output
is, in principle, continuous.
5B. Holevo Information
We upper bound the leaked information, χEB , by calculat-
ing the Holevo term for a Gaussian channel with the same co-
variance matrix (CM) between Alice and Bob’s quadratures
as that of our system [48, 49]. In order to find the CM, in
the case of our thermal-loss channel, we first need to find
the bipartite state between Alice mode â0 and Bob mode b̂3
for the proposed QPSK setup in Fig. 3. In doing so, we let
mode â1 of the state in Eq. (1) to propagate through the noisy
quantum channel, which we model via a beam splitter, with
transmissivity T , which couples Alice’s signal to the thermal
state in Eq. (2), and subsequently undergoes the QS operation.
Quantum scissors involve a measurement as they are success-
ful if only one of their detectors clicks. We define measurement
operator M̂ = (1−|0〉1〈0|)⊗|0〉2〈0|, corresponding to a click
on detector D1 and no click on D2, where 1 represents the
identity operator for optical mode entering D1, and |0〉1 and
|0〉2 are vacuum states corresponding to, respectively, optical
modes b̂1 and b̂2.
In order to calculate the joint state of modes â0 and b̂3, we
follow the same procedure as in Ref. [24] that relies on finding
input-output characteristic functions for the module Γ in Fig. 3.
Upon a successful QS operation, i.e., M̂ measurement, we
obtain
ρ̂03 =
1
4PPS
3∑
k=0
3∑
l=0
|ψk〉0〈ψl| ⊗ Ω̂kl3 , (16)
where
Ω̂kl3 =
∫
d2ξ3
pi
ζklA (ξ3)D̂N (̂b3, ξ3) (17)
is the state that Bob measures, with D̂N (̂b, ξ) = e
ξb̂†e−ξ
∗b̂
being the normally-ordered displacement operator of mode b̂.
In Eq. (17),
ζklA (ξ3) =
∫
d2ξ1
pi
d2ξ2
pi
χklA (ξ1, ξ2, ξ3) (18)
where, for |αk〉1〈αl| as the input state,
χklA (ξ1, ξ2, ξ3) =e
−F |ξ1−ξ2|2e
√
T
2 [α
∗
l (ξ1−ξ2)−αk(ξ∗1−ξ∗2 )]
× e−µ2 |ξ1+ξ2+
√
2 gξ3|2e−
1−µ
2 |ξ1+ξ2−
√
2 /gξ3|2
× (piδ2(ξ1)− 1)
(
1− µ
2
|ξ1 + ξ2 +
√
2 gξ3|2
)
(19)
is the antinormally-ordered characteristic function of the out-
put states in Fig. 3 after tracing over the noise mode b̂N, which
belongs to a potential eavesdropper. Also, success probability
for measurement M̂ is given by
PPS =
1
4
3∑
k=0
∫
d2ξ1
pi
d2ξ2
pi
χkkA (ξ1, ξ2, 0)
=
1
4
3∑
k=0
ζkkA (0) = ζ
00
A (0), (20)
where ζklA (0) is given by Eq. (23). This result exactly matches
that of the P&M scheme, given in Eq. (5). We remark that the
total success probability is given by Psucc = 2P
PS = 2ζ00A (0),
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Fig. 3. Entanglement-based version of the QS-amplified CV-QKD scheme.
The noisy quantum channel and the QS are considered as a combined system,
with input modes â1 − â3, and âN, and output modes b̂1 − b̂3, and b̂N. The
initial state of modes represented by â0 − â1 is given by |Ψ〉01. The initial
state of the modes represented by operators â2, â3, and âN is, respectively,
given by a single photon, a vacuum, and the thermal state in Eq. (2).
which also accounts for the case of D2 clicking and D1 not
clicking.
Next, in order to find a lower bound on the secret key rate,
following original works in [33, 37], we use the optimality of
Gaussian collective attacks in the asymptotic limit for a given
CM [48, 49]. Now that the bipartite state between Alice and
Bob is given by Eq. (16), we can work out the first and second
order moments in the CM, which is turned out to be in the
standard symplectic form [13] below:
VAB =
(
Vx1 Vxyσz
Vxyσz Vy1
)
, (21)
where 1 = diag(1, 1) and σz = diag(1,−1) are Pauli matrices.
In Appendix A, we derive the closed form expression of the
triplet (Vx, Vxy, Vy). Note that the obtained CM, in the case of
having a successful QS operation for vacuum state at the input,
i.e., when α = 0, results in identity CM, i.e., VAB = 1⊗1, as
one would expect. Having found the CM, one can then work
out a bound on Holevo information using the set of equations
given in Appendix C.
An important feature of the CM in Eq. (21) is its correlation
parameter, defined as Z
(QS)
4 = Vxy/
√
T , which characterizes
the amount of correlation between the parties’s quadratures
upon a successful QS operation. Figure 4 compares Z
(QS)
4
in our QS-based system with that of the no-QS setup, Z4,
in [37], and then compares both with that of the Gaus-
sian modulation case without (ZG) and with (Z
(NLA)
G ) an
ideal NLA. In the case of Gaussian modulation without an
NLA, instead of |Ψ〉01, we start with a TMSV state given
by
√
1− λ2 ∑∞n=0 λn|n〉0|n〉1, for which the corresponding
CM is given by
(
(VA + 1)1 ZGσz
ZGσz (VA + 1)1
)
, with ZG =√
V 2A + 2VA , where VA = 2λ
2/(1− λ2) is its corresponding
modulation variance. The parameter λ in the above TMSV
state would ideally change to gλ once one arm of the TMSV
state goes through an ideal NLA with gain g [26]. The corre-
sponding correlation term, Z
(NLA)
G , can then be calculated by√
(V ′A)2 + 2V
′
A , where V
′
A = 2g
2λ2/(1− g2λ2).
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Figure 4 compares the above four correlation parameters as
a function of VA. In the case of the QPSK protocol, VA = 2α
2.
We can see that Z
(QS)
4 overtakes the two no-NLA curves at a
VA around 0.15. This suggests that the amount of correlation
between the trusted parties’ signals has been enhanced by the
use of a QS. This may imply that higher key generation rates
can be obtained in certain regimes of operation. One should,
however, note that by increasing VA, hence α, we may reduce
the success probability of the QS system. Furthermore, by
increasing α, Eve’s Gaussian attack would be further away
from her optimal attack. We will discuss this point in our
numerical results when we optimize the secret key rate over
system parameters. One final interesting point in Fig. 4 is that
the correlation term for the ideal NLA is always better than
the QS system. This may suggest that the earlier analysis that
rely on an ideal NLA may overestimate what can be achieved
with a realistic NLA system.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present some numerical results for the
secret key rate of our QS-amplified QPSK CV-QKD system
and compare it with that of the no-QS protocol, and its
Gaussian modulated (GM) variants. To that end, we solve a
dual optimization problem. We find the maximum value for the
lower bound in Eq. (12) by optimizing over α, which specifies
the modulation variance, and the QS parameter g, which
specifies the QS amplification gain. In our numerical results,
for a channel with length L, we assume that T = 10−κL/10,
where κ = 0.2 dB/km is the loss factor for optical fibers.
Also, we nominally assume a reconciliation efficiency equal
to one and that Bob, upon successful QS events, uses an ideal
homodyne detection, with no electronic noise, to measure the
received signals.
Figure 5 shows the optimized key rates for the no-QS
[33, 37] and QS-equipped discrete modulation protocols versus
distance. We observe that the behavior of the different curves
shown in Fig. 5 is very much akin to the Gaussian modulation
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Fig. 5. Numerical results of the optimized secret key rate for QS-equipped
QPSK modulation CV-QKD protocol versus distance (dashed lines), as
compared to that of the protocol with no-QS (solid lines). The ultimate
thermal-loss PLOB bound [50] is shown at the top.
QS-equipped CV-QKD presented in Ref. [24]. In particular,
the QS-based systems are capable of beating their no-QS
counterparts after a certain distance, and considerably increase
the maximum security distance achievable by the underlying
QKD protocol. The crossover distance at an input excess noise
equal to 0 and 0.01 shot-noise units (SNU) is, respectively,
around 120 km and 110 km. In the case of εtm = 0.05,
the no-QS system has a very low reach, whereas, by using
a QS, the system can now provide positive secret key rates at
distances over 140 km. It can also be seen that the QS based
system offers either zero or very low secret key rates at short
distances. This, as pointed out in Ref. [24], can be because
of the additional noise by the QS, especially, for large inputs,
which requires us to use much lower values of α that would
be used in the no-QS system. This could make the signal
component, at short distances, less than the excess noise part,
hence resulting in no secure keys.
The opposite effect is seen at long distances where QS-
based systems are offering a key rate parallel to the funda-
mental bounds for secret key generation rate for a thermal-
loss channel (labeled by TL-PLOB). This is the bound given
in Eq. (23) of Ref. [50] at an equivalent mean thermal photon
number, n¯ = εtmT/(2(1 − T )), to our receiver excess noise
(here at εtm = 0.05) [51]. This extended security distance
suggests that once the input to the QS is low enough, which
is at long distances, the post-selection offered by the QS can
improve the signal-to-noise ratio to a level that positive secret
key rates are distillable. We have numerically verified that
positive key rates are indeed achievable for εtm < 0.09 for
the QS-based system.
The QS-equipped discrete modulation (DM) system in this
work seems to offer more resilience to excess noise and
channel loss than its GM counterpart considered in Ref. [24].
For instance, the maximum tolerable excess noise in the latter
case is around 0.06 SNU as compared to 0.09 SNU in the
former case. The secret key rate obtained at a high excess noise
value of 0.05 SNU is also higher for the DM versus GM case.
This has been shown in Fig. 6 where the secret key rate for
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of the Gaussian modulated (GM) GG02 protocol with and without a QS. The
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both systems, in the presence and absence of a QS, has been
shown. This result is, however, counter-intuitive, and must be
taken with caution. There is a fundamental difference between
the GM and DM case in that the latter is not a Gaussian
modulation especially for large values of α. As shown in
Fig. 7, the optimal value of α is around 0.7 at εtm = 0.05. In
our analysis, we have, however, assumed that Eve is restricted
to a Gaussian attack, which will become less optimal as the
input modulation deviates further from a Gaussian one. What
our numerical results would then suggest is that for an Eve
restricted to an entangling cloner, it is better to use a non-
Gaussian modulation as this would make Eve’s attack even
less optimal.
If we want to obtain a more realistic account of what a
non-restricted Eve could achieve in our system, we should
then cap the choice of α in our optimization to a value that
preserves the Gaussianity of the input signal to some good
extent. A suggested cap for α is given in [43] to be around
0.5. The lower curve in Fig. 6 shows the secret key rate under
this constraint, while the corresponding optimal value of g
is shown in Fig. 7. It is now clear that the rate obtained
for the DM case, at β = 1, is lower than that of the GM
case. The no-QS GM system will, however, offer no positive
key rate for β < 0.98, which implies that, if one considers
the more efficient reconciliation techniques for DM systems,
there would be regimes of operation where the DM system
outperforms the GM case. Note that, as shown in Fig. 7, by
capping α, larger values of gain is needed by the QS to achieve
the optimal key rate.
Finally, we would like to comment on the suitability of
quantum scissors in CV quantum repeaters. One of the objec-
tives of calculating the key rate of a QS equipped CV-QKD
system was the similarity of the setup to what was proposed, as
the main building block, in recent proposals for CV repeaters
[30, 32]. Our intuition was that if a realistic QS could not
offer any advantage over the no-QS one, then the prospect
of a CV repeater that relies on such QS devices would also
be questionable. Our results suggest that there are regimes
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of operation that QS-based systems offer some advantage. We
are, however, short of a convincing argument that such regimes
of operation would be those in which repeater systems could
operate as well. In fact, while our results keep the prospect
of functioning CV repeaters open, they also highlight the
importance of considering all noise effects before jumping into
any conclusions. Our analysis could then be used to further
study the proposed repeater setups and assess how, in practice,
they can perform.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this work, we studied the performance of a CV-QKD
system that used quadrature phase shift keying modulation at
the encoder and a certain optical state truncation device, i.e., a
quantum scissor, before its homodyne receiver. The objective
was to find if and to what extent the use of a QS, as a non-
deterministic amplifier, could improve the rate behavior of
the system at long distances. We showed that, by optimizing
the relevant system parameters, the QS-equipped system could
tolerate more excess noise than the no-QS discrete-modulation
system, and therefore could reach longer distances at positive
values of excess noise. This effect was similar to that of a
Gaussian-modulated CV-QKD system [24], but in the discrete-
modulation case we observed additional tolerance against
excess noise if only Gaussian attacks are considered, or assume
lower reconciliation efficiencies for the Gaussian modulation
case, as is often the case in practice. This enables us to extend
the reach of CV-QKD systems provided that we supplement
them with additional devices such as single-photon sources
and single-photon detectors [52, 53]. This, at first, may sound
counterproductive as it takes away some of the practical
advantages of CV-QKD systems. But, one should note that
these additional equipment are only needed at the receiver end
of the link, which, in a practical setup, can represent a shared
network node in a quantum network. Moreover, our analysis
would specify the range of distances for which the use of a
quantum scissor could be beneficial. Over shorter distances,
one could still use a conventional system without an NLA.
There are several experimental advances in the field that
make the implementation of the analysed system here feasible
8in the short term. An early demonstration of the QS operation
using heralded single-photon sources based on parametric
down-conversion and avalanche photodiodes, as single-photon
detectors, has already provided a proof-of-principle for the
main building block of the system. With current technology,
one can use higher quality single-photon sources based on
quantum dot structures, and nanowire superconducting detec-
tors for highly efficient low-noise photodetetion [52, 53]. A
combination of these two could bring down the internal noise
in a QS module below a critical level that one can observe the
benefits of deploying QSs in long-distance CV-QKD systems,
as we have predicted in this work. This will be experimentally
tested as part of our future work.
The research conducted here can be further extended in
several directions. Our study would, in particular, be highly
relevant to analysing the performance of recently proposed
continuous-variable quantum repeater systems in [30], which
rely on a similar building block as we studied in this work.
In their proposal, dual homodyne detection modules are used
to connect different blocks in the system. Considering the
sensitivity to the excess noise in each leg of the system, it
would be interesting to find out the regimes of operation in
which a multi-hop CV repeater can be used for QKD purposes.
One can compare the obtained key rates in this case with the
already known benchmarks for the repeaterless links, i.e., the
PLOB bound [50], as well as multi-node repeater setups [54].
Another possible avenue for future work is to find better NLA
schemes than QSs that better match the discrete modulation
scheme used in this work. In fact, an alternative to QSs is
a quantum comparison amplifier, which works on the basis
of comparing the input coherent state with a known coherent
state [55, 56]. Such an amplifier is still non-deterministic, but,
it does not need single-photon sources. Because a comparison
amplifier can only amplify states that are chosen from a pre-
known finite set of coherent states, it can possibly be a good
fit to the QPSK-modulation protocol, where the number of
transmitted coherent states is finite. Finally, one can also
explore the use of numerical techniques [43, 44] for key rate
analysis, which can possibly better address the case of non-
Gaussian attacks, and/or when analytical solutions become too
cumbersome.
APPENDIX
In this section we calculate the triplet that quantifies the
CM of our QS system, given in Eq. (21).
A. Variance at Alice’s side (Vx)
By definition, and using the bipartite state in Eq. (16), we
have:
Vx = tr(ρ̂03x̂
2
0) =
1
4PPS
3∑
k=0
3∑
l=0
GklHkl, (22)
where x̂0 = â0 + â
†
0 in Fig. 3, Gkl := tr(|ψk〉0〈ψl|x̂20) and
Hkl := tr(Ω̂
kl
3 ) = ζ
kl
A (0). We then find that:
Hkl = ζ
kl
A (0) = akle
−Tαkα
∗
l
2F+1 − 1− µ
2F
e−
Tαkα
∗
l
2F
akl =
2
(2F + 1)3
(
(2F + 1)2 − µ(2F + 1) + µTαkα∗l
)
.
(23)
One can then use the set of identities in Eq. (31) to work out
the following expression:
Vx =1 +
α2
ζ00A (0)
(
δ1
[−A sinh( Tα2
2F + 1
) +B cosh(
Tα2
2F + 1
) + C sinh(
Tα2
2F
)
]
+δ2
[
A cosh(
Tα2
2F + 1
)−B sinh( Tα
2
2F + 1
)− C cosh(Tα
2
2F
)
]
+δ3
[−A sin( Tα2
2F + 1
) +B cos(
Tα2
2F + 1
) + C sin(
Tα2
2F
)
]
/2
−δ4
[
A cos(
Tα2
2F + 1
) +B sin(
Tα2
2F + 1
)− C cos(Tα
2
2F
)
]
/2
)
,
(24)
where A = 2(2F+1)3
(
(2F +1)2 − µ(2F +1)
)
, B = 2µTα
2
(2F+1)3 ,
C = 1−µ2F , δ1 =
λ0
λ1
+ λ2λ3 , δ2 =
λ1
λ2
+ λ3λ0 , δ3 =
λ0
λ1
− λ2λ3 , and
δ4 =
λ1
λ2
− λ3λ0 . Note that for α = 0, Vx = 1 is obtained.
B. Variance at Bob’s side (Vy)
The variance at the receiver’s side can be computed as
follows:
Vy = tr(ρ̂03x̂
2
3) =
1
4PPS
3∑
k=0
Lkk, (25)
where, assuming ξ3 = z + it,
Lkk =tr(Ω̂
kk
3 x̂
2
3)
=− ζkkA (0, 0)−
d2
dt2
ζkkA (0, t)
∣∣∣
t=0
d2
dt2
ζkkA (0, t)
∣∣∣
t=0
=− bke−
T |αk|
2
2F+1 +
2(1− µ)
F
e−
T |αk|
2
2F ,
(26)
with x̂3 = b̂3 + b̂
†
3 in Fig. 3 and bk =
8
(2F+1)3
(
(2F + 1)2 −
µ(2F 2 + 3F + 1) + µT |αk|2
)
; hence,
Vy =
L00
ζ00A (0)
=
1
ζ00A (0)
(
bke
−T |αk|
2
2F+1 − 2(1− µ)
F
e−
T |αk|
2
2F
)
− 1. (27)
Note that for α = 0, Vy = 1 is obtained.
C. Co-variance between Alice and Bob (Vxy)
By definition, the co-variance between Alice and Bob is
given by:
Vxy = tr(ρ̂03x̂0x̂3) =
1
4PPS
3∑
k=0
3∑
l=0
NklSkl, (28)
9where Nkl := tr(|ψk〉0〈ψl|x̂0) is given in Eq. (31) and
Skl =tr(Ω̂
kl
3 x̂3)
=− i d
dt
ζklA (0, t)
∣∣∣
t=0
=
2
√
µ(1− µ)T (αk + α∗l )
(2F + 1)2
e−
Tαkα
∗
l
2F+1 (29)
One can then conclude that:
Vxy =
2
√
µ(1− µ)T α2
PPS(2F + 1)2
(
ω1 cosh(
Tα2
2F + 1
)
− ω2 sinh( Tα
2
2F + 1
) + ω3 cos(
Tα2
2F + 1
)
− ω4 sin( Tα
2
2F + 1
)
)
, (30)
where ω1 =
√
λ0
λ1
+
√
λ2
λ3
, ω2 =
√
λ1
λ2
+
√
λ3
λ0
, ω3 =
√
λ0
λ1
−√
λ2
λ3
, and ω4 =
√
λ1
λ2
−
√
λ3
λ0
. It is seen that for α = 0,
Vxy = 0 is obtained.
In the calculations of Gkl and Nkl we made use of the
following identities:
|ψ0〉 =1
2
[|φ0〉+ eipi/4|φ1〉+ eipi/2|φ2〉+ e3ipi/4|φ3〉],
â|ψ0〉 =α
2
[
eipi/4
√
λ0
λ1
|φ0〉+ eipi/2
√
λ1
λ2
|φ1〉
+ ei3pi/4
√
λ2
λ3
|φ2〉 −
√
λ3
λ0
|φ3〉
]
,
â2|ψ0〉 =α
2
2
[
eipi/2
√
λ0
λ2
|φ0〉+ ei3pi/4
√
λ1
λ3
|φ1〉
−
√
λ2
λ0
|φ2〉 − eipi/4
√
λ3
λ1
|φ3〉
]
,
|ψ1〉 =1
2
[|φ0〉+ ei3pi/4|φ1〉+ ei3pi/2|φ2〉+ eipi/4|φ3〉],
â|ψ1〉 =α
2
[
ei3pi/4
√
λ0
λ1
|φ0〉+ ei3pi/2
√
λ1
λ2
|φ1〉
+ eipi/4
√
λ2
λ3
|φ2〉 −
√
λ3
λ0
|φ3〉
]
,
â2|ψ1〉 =α
2
2
[
ei3pi/2
√
λ0
λ2
|φ0〉+ eipi/4
√
λ1
λ3
|φ1〉
−
√
λ2
λ0
|φ2〉 − ei3pi/4
√
λ3
λ1
|φ3〉
]
,
|ψ2〉 =1
2
[|φ0〉+ e−i3pi/4|φ1〉+ eipi/2|φ2〉+ e−ipi/4|φ3〉],
â|ψ2〉 =α
2
[
e−i3pi/4
√
λ0
λ1
|φ0〉+ eipi/2
√
λ1
λ2
|φ1〉
+ eipi/4
√
λ2
λ3
|φ2〉 −
√
λ3
λ0
|φ3〉
]
,
â2|ψ2〉 =α
2
2
[
eipi/2
√
λ0
λ2
|φ0〉+ e−ipi/4
√
λ1
λ3
|φ1〉
−
√
λ2
λ0
|φ2〉 − e−i3pi/4
√
λ3
λ1
|φ3〉
]
,
|ψ3〉 =1
2
[|φ0〉+ e−ipi/4|φ1〉+ ei3pi/2|φ2〉+ e−3ipi/4|φ3〉],
â|ψ3〉 =α
2
[
e−ipi/4
√
λ0
λ1
|φ0〉+ ei3pi/2
√
λ1
λ2
|φ1〉
+ e−i3pi/4
√
λ2
λ3
|φ2〉 −
√
λ3
λ0
|φ3〉
]
,
â2|ψ3〉 =α
2
2
[
ei3pi/2
√
λ0
λ2
|φ0〉+ e−i3pi/4
√
λ1
λ3
|φ1〉
−
√
λ2
λ0
|φ2〉 − e−ipi/4
√
λ3
λ1
|φ3〉
]
. (31)
For a CM in the following standard symplectic form
VAB =
(
Vx1 Vxyσz
Vxyσz Vy1
)
, (32)
the Holevo information is upper bounded by:
χEB = g(Λ1) + g(Λ2)− g(Λ3), (33)
where g(x) = (x+12 ) log2(
x+1
2 ) − x−12 log2 x−12 and Λ1/2 =√(
W ±√W 2 − 4D2 )/2 and Λ3 =√VxD/Vy , with W =
V 2x +V
2
y −2V 2xy and D = VxVy−V 2xy . Note that one can also
take into account imperfect effects of the homodyne receiver.
We however assume an ideal homodyne detection in this work.
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